Aggregate signature scheme proposed by Boneh, Gentry, Lynn, and Shacham allows n signatures on n distinct messages from n distinct users to aggregate a single signature that convince any verifier that n users did indeed sign the n messages, respectively. The main benefit of such schemes is that they allow bandwidth and computational savings. In this paper, we question about whether the existing aggregate signature schemes satisfy the basic property that they can convince any verifier that every user indeed signed the message which should be signed by him. We show that Rückert et al.'s scheme, and Shim's scheme do not satisfy the property. As a comparison, we investigate Boneh et al.'s scheme and show that under the assumption that each signer correctly signs one message, Boneh et al.'s scheme satisfies this property under two users' setting. Furthermore, we propose the concept of inside attack on aggregate signatures and give an improved aggregate signature scheme based on Shim's scheme. We also prove that the improved scheme is secure against inside attack.
Introduction
An aggregate signature scheme as introduced by Boneh et al. 1 is a method for combining n signatures from n different signers on n different messages into a single signature. This single signature and the n original messages will convince the verifier that the n signers did indeed sign the n original messages i.e., signer i signed message m i for i 1, . . . , n . Typical applications for aggregate signatures are, for example, secure routing 2 or certificate chain compression 1 . The main benefit of aggregate signature is that it saves bandwidth, which makes it an optimal solution for networks of small, battery-powered devices that communicate over energy-consuming wireless channels 3 .
Since Boneh et al.'s aggregate signature scheme, many aggregate signature schemes are proposed 4-10 . There even are aggregate proxy signature 11 and aggregate 2 Journal of Applied Mathematics signcryption schemes 12 . However, about the security of aggregate signature schemes, only traditional unforgeability was discussed in all existing schemes. We question that whether every existing aggregate signature satisfies the basic property proposed by Boneh et al. that it convinces any verifier that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, signer i indeed signed message m i which should be signed by him; he didnot signed message m j . Because in some situation an aggregate signature may satisfy the verification, even though signer i signed message m j . We call this attack an inside attack on aggregate signatures. We think this is an important issue to aggregate signatures. Shao 13 discussed the security of aggregate signatures, but its issue was another aspect. He pointed that every signer i forges a signature σ i
also satisfies the aggregate signature verification.
Recently, Rückert et al. 6 proposed the first aggregate signature in standard model. The scheme was based on the Boneh-Silverberg signature 14 . They proved its traditional unforgeability in the standard model while maintaining an optimal signature size and reasonable efficiency. However, in this paper, we show that Rückert et al.'s scheme does not satisfy the basic property that a verifier, given the aggregate signature along with the identities if the parties involved and their respective messages, can be convinced that signer i indeed signed message m i which should be signed by him. In 2010, Shim proposed an efficient ID-based aggregate signature scheme with constant pairing computations 8 . It is the first scheme whose number of pairing computation in verification is independent of the number of users. But, in this paper we point that Shim's scheme also does not satisfy the basic property. As a comparison, we investigate Boneh et al.'s scheme 1 and show that under the assumption that each signer signs one message correctly, Boneh et al.'s scheme satisfies this property under two users' setting. Furthermore, we propose an improved scheme based on Shim's scheme and prove that the improved scheme is secure against the inside attack.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce preliminaries and the computational assumption. Section 3 investigates the security of Rückert et al.'s aggregate signature. Section 4 investigates the security of the aggregate signature of Shim. As a comparison, we study Boneh et al.'s aggregate signature scheme in Section 5. The improved scheme is in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper.
Preliminary

The Bilinear Pairing
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q, and G 2 a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a pairing map which satisfies the following conditions. The concept of inside attack is closely related to the basic property of aggregate signature that it should convince any verifier that every user indeed signed the message which should be signed by him.
The Security of the Aggregate Signature Rückert et al.'s Scheme
Brief Review of Rückert et al.'s Scheme
In Rückert et al.'s scheme 6 , two groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order l and a multilinear map e are used; g is a generator of G 1 . If a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Z, and 
Key Generation
The key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter. It randomly selects 2n elements a 1,0 , a 1,1 , . . . , a n,0 , a n,1 ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1}. The algorithm computes
and returns the private key and the public key pair:
. . , a n,0 , a n,1 , pk
Signature Issue
It accepts as input a message m m 1 , . . . , m n ∈ {0, 1} n as well as signing key sk a 1,0 , a 1,1 , . . . , a n,0 , a n,1 and computes the signature σ g n i 1 a i,m i . 
Signature Verification
The Security of Rückert et al.'s Scheme
In Rückert et al.'s scheme, let n 2, two users A 1 , A 2 with private key and pubic key pairs: In this situation, the aggregate signature cannot convince the verifier that signer i signed message m i . So Rückert et al.'s aggregate signature is not secure; it does not satisfy the property that a verifier, given the aggregate signature along with the identities if the parties involved and their respective messages, can be convinced that signer i indeed signed message m i which should be signed by him. It is not secure against the inside forgery attack.
The Security of Shim's Aggregate Signature Scheme
Brief Review of Shim's Scheme
Shim's scheme 8 comprises five algorithms.
Setup. Given security parameter k ∈ Z, the algorithm works as follows.
1 Generate a prime q, a cyclic additive group G 1 and a cyclic multiplicative group G 2 of prime order q, a generator P in G 1 and an admissible pairing e :
2 Pick a random s ∈ Z 
Extract
For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1} * .
2 Set the private key S ID to be s · Q ID , where s is a master secret.
Sign
Given a private S ID and a message M ∈ {0, 1} * .
1 Choose r ∈ R Z * q and compute U r · P ∈ G 1 .
Agg
For the aggregating set of users S, assign to each user an index i, ranging from 1 to k |S|. 
Attack on Shim's Scheme
respectively. 
respectively. They have not signed M 1 and M 2 , respectively.
3 They claim that they generate aggregate signature σ
Holds. A 1 and A 2 succeed in forging aggregate signature for ID 1 ,
The weakness of Shim's scheme against this inside forgery attack is due to the separation of the message signed and the private key in the signing equation
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The Security of Boneh et al.'s Aggregate Schemes
We can investigate the security of Boneh et al.'s aggregate signature scheme 1 to provide further illustration to this flaw of about two schemes.
Brief Review of Boneh et al.'s Scheme
In Boneh et al.'s aggregate signature, two cyclic multiplicative groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order and a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 are used. g is a generator of G 1 . The scheme employs a hash function h : {0, 1} · → G 2 .
Boneh et al.'s aggregate signature scheme comprises five algorithms.
Key Generation
For a user, pick random x ← Z p , and compute v g x . The user's public key is v ∈ G 1 , and secret key is x ∈ Z p .
Signing
Given the secret key x and a message m ∈ {0, 1} · , compute h h m , and the signature σ h x .
Verification
Given user's public key v, a message m, and a signature σ, compute h h m ; accept if e g, σ e v, h holds.
Aggregation
For the aggregating set of users U, assign to each user an index i, ranging from 1 to k |U|. Each user u i ∈ U provides a signature σ i ∈ G 2 on a message m i ∈ {0, 1} · of his choice. Compute the aggregate signature σ k i 1 σ i .
Aggregate Verification
Given an aggregate signature σ for an aggregating set of users U, indexed as before, and given the original messages m i ∈ {0, 1} · and public keys v i for all users u i ∈ U. Compute 2 , h
The Security of Boneh et al.'s Scheme
x 1 −x 2 1 h x 1 −x 2 2 , h 1 h 2 , h m 1 h m 2 .
5.3
So if the hash function h is secured, h m 1 / h m 2 , then, under the assumption that each signer signs one message correctly, Boneh et al.'s scheme does not suffer the same flaw as about two schemes under two users.
6. An Improvement of Shim's Identity-Based Aggregate Signature Scheme
The Improved Scheme
The improved scheme comprises five algorithms.
1 Generate a prime q, a cyclic additive group G 1 and a cyclic multiplicative group G 2 of prime order q, two random generators P and Q in G 1 , and an admissible pairing e :
Extract
Sign
1 Choose r ∈ R Z * q and compute U r · P ∈ G 1 . 2 Compute h H 2 ID, M, U ∈ Z q and V hS ID r · Q ∈ G 1 . The signature on M is σ U, V .
Agg
Security of the Improved Scheme
Following the method in 10 , it is easy to prove that the improved scheme is secure against the traditional existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message and an adaptive-chosen identity attack. Here, we only show that our improvement is secure against the inside attack proposed by us. Take two signers as example, let ID 1 be the identity of signer A 1 , and ID 2 the identity of signer A 2 . If they cooperate to do as following: 
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the security of some aggregate signature schemes. We show that Rückert et al.'s scheme cannot convince the verifier that every signer indeed signed the message which should be signed by him. Shim's scheme also suffers such flaw. As a comparison, we investigate Boneh et al.'s scheme and show that under the assumption that each signer signs one message correctly, Boneh et al.'s aggregate scheme can convince the verifier that every signer indeed signed the message which should be signed by him under two users. Furthermore, we propose the concept of inside attack on aggregate signatures and give an improved scheme based on Shim's scheme. We also prove that the improved scheme is secured against the inside attack.
